Research Article **ISSN 2835-6276**

American Journal of Medical and Clinical Research & Reviews

The Hands and the Face Detachability and the Brother I Did Not Want to See

Julian Ungar-Sargon MD, PhD

*Correspondence: Julian Ungar-Sargon

Received: 20 Aug 2026; Accepted: 30 Aug 2026; Published:05 Sep 2026

Citation: Julian Ungar-Sargon. The Hands and the Face Detachability and the Brother I Did Not Want to See. AJMCRR. 2026; 5(9): 1-35.

Abstract

This essay adjudicates between two working drafts that were made to be joined and would not join and completes the adjudication with a mechanism drawn from a paper of my own that appeared to belong to another field altogether. The first draft treats Erich Neumann's collective Shadow and the trajectory of genocide after Auschwitz; the second reads Jacob's disguise, Isaac's blind hands, and the night at the Jabbok; my own paper explains why rabbinic culture took Greek drugs and instruments and declined the humours, the tripartite soul, and the teleological demiurge. The quarrel between the two drafts runs in three registers — a categorical method against the irreducible face, retrospective wisdom against a living recoil, and divine hiddenness as covenantal event against concealment as the constitutive condition of a world — and the third paper resolves all three by supplying a mechanism: detachability.

A remedy travels alone; a system arrives with its theology. Six claims carry the argument.

First, an archetypal grammar may describe the operation a persecutor performs upon persons and may never describe the persons; the Genesis material is the brake this rule requires, and Sandmel's bar against both false parallels and false absences is the evidentiary discipline that goes with it.

Second, assimilation and scapegoating are opposite poles of one axis, since both abolish distinction — one erasing the boundary between Jew and gentile from within and by choice, the other erasing the boundary among Jews from without and by decree; the assimilationist's wish was granted in the wrong currency.

Third, emancipation was a detachability wager that failed twice over: the goods were bundled, and the buyer was not the party competent to decide what travelled alone.

Fourth, the standard resolution of the assimilated Jew's ambivalence toward the Ostjude — that Auschwitz collapsed the distinction and voided it — is a resolution donated by the murderer, and I withdraw it.

Fifth, tzimtzum and hester panim belong to different grammars, ontological and covenantal, held together on the Maimonidean precedent of two criteria in one skull without synthesis; the Chabad ordering in which withdrawal precedes sin permits both without allowing either to console.

Sixth, genocide's decisive step is jurisdictional rather than rhetorical — the manufacture of a person about whom the law has been made silent — which is what the psychology of projection underdescribes.

A central section asks what has become of the archetypal engine Jung named Wotan in 1936: deterritorialized, leaderless, mechanically amplified and far faster, while the grammar it drives is unchanged and its vocabularies have merely rotated.

The essay closes at Peniel, where reconciliation is one meeting of faces, two separate roads, and a limp; and at the covered blood, which the crematoria were built to prevent from crying.

Keywords: Erich Neumann, detachability, Wotan, archetypal projection, hester panim, tzimtzum, apophatic theology, collective Shadow, assimilation, Ostjuden, Vienna, Peniel, anti-theodicy, Levinas.



Two Drafts That Do Not Agree

Two working drafts have sat on my desk this year, made to be joined and refusing to join, alongside a paper of my own that I did not think belonged with them at all.

I did not write the two drafts. They came to me as working documents on a problem I have been circling for years, and I am not going to identify them further, since their provenance is not what is interesting about them. What is interesting is that they set out two lines of argument I recognize as live, that each is powerful, and that they cannot both be conducted at once. Not being their author carries one advantage worth naming: I can dismantle them without the flattering suspicion that I am performing humility about myself.

The first, After the Hidden Face, moves from Erich Neumann's psychology of the collective Shadow to the trajectory of genocide after Auschwitz, and ends by setting the hiddenness of the divine face against the visibility of the human one. The second, The Assimilationist's Double Bind, was drafted as an insertion into the first: a reading of Jacob in his brother's goatskins, of Isaac's blind hands, and of the night at the Jabbok that gives the essay's central word, panim, its second and unexpected home in the placename Peniel. The third, A Remedy Travels Alone, is a historical study of why rabbinic culture took Greek drugs, instruments and disease-

names and declined the humours, the tripartite soul and the teleological demiurge [1]. It has nothing to do with the other two, and it turns out to contain the mechanism they were both reaching for.

The two would not join. I discovered this in the ordinary way, by trying to paste the second into the first and finding that the seam would not close. What follows is an attempt to say why, and to see whether they can be reconciled — which, as I will argue at the end, is a word who's meaning the texts themselves must teach me, since neither Genesis nor the twentieth century supplies the tidy kind.

The quarrel runs in three registers.

The first is methodological. The genocide essay works by generalization. It lays Cambodia, Rwanda, Srebrenica, Darfur and Sinjar in a row so that a common structure can be seen through them: person becomes category, category becomes threat, threat becomes contaminant, contaminant becomes legitimate target. But to see that structure you must look past the person, and looking past the person is precisely the operation the essay is indicting. The Jacob essay works the other way. It stays inside one family, one blind father, one night, one wound, and its climax is an encounter with a stranger who will not give his name — an insistence that the face is exactly what refuses to be resolved into a category. The second essay is therefore not an insert. It is a brake on the first essay's method, and I did not notice I had written a brake.

The second register is historical, and it concerns the Ostjude. Both essays touch the assimilated Central European Jew's recoil from the visibly Orthodox Eastern Jew, and both dispose of it too quickly, in opposite directions. The genocide essay resolves the recoil by pointing out that Auschwitz collapsed the distinction anyway: the Viennese physician and the Hasid from Galicia entered the same racial category, so the distinction was always an illusion. The Jacob essay dissolves it differently, into the elegance of a typology in which everyone is Jacob and the majority culture is Isaac. Neither is honest about what happens in the body of a man like me when he passes a Hasidic family on a Vienna pavement, and I have written elsewhere at length about that afternoon [2,3].

The third register is theological. The genocide essay treats hester panim as an event: a withdrawal inside a relationship that has a history, radicalized past bearing by the murder of children. The Jacob essay treats concealment as constitutive: Ein Sof precedes every name, Maimonides' negations are a matter of logical necessity, tzimtzum is the condition of there being a nameable world at all. If concealment is constitutive, Auschwitz discloses nothing new about God, and the first essay's wound is a category error. If concealment is an event, the apophatic tradition is beside the point, and the second essay is ornament.

Three quarrels, then: category against face, hindsight against the flicker, event against condition.

My own third paper resolves all three, and it does so with a mechanism that has nothing to do with any of them. A Remedy Travels Alone argues that rabbinic culture borrowed from Greek medicine whatever could be lifted clean of its cosmology and declined whatever arrived bundled with claims about what a body is and who made it. A remedy travels alone; a system arrives with its theology. That principle, developed to explain a loanword distribution in late antiquity, turns out to be the

deep grammar of the assimilationist's bargain, of idolatry, of the persecutor's authorship, and — this is the part I did not expect — of my own recoil on a Vienna street. What follows is one argument in fourteen movements, built on that hinge, with a map (section IV, Figure 1) and a question about the present (section XI): if Jung's Wotan named the archetypal engine of 1936, what is running now, what has changed in its distribution, and what has not changed at all.

I should say at the outset that the settlement reached here is not a synthesis. I have found before that the honest end of a line of thought is sometimes the steady inhabitation of an antinomy rather than its closure and have had to revisit and partly recant an earlier conclusion on exactly that ground [4]. This essay ends the same way, and I have stopped regarding that as a failure of nerve.

The Method That Resembles Its Object

Let me put the methodological problem as sharply as I can, because it is the one that makes the other two tractable.

Neumann's achievement, from The Origins and History of Consciousness [5] through Depth Psychology and a New Ethic [6], and now legible in a different light through the posthumous two volumes of The Roots of Jewish Consciousness [7,8], is a general account of how collectives dispose of what they cannot own. The Shadow is what consciousness will not acknowledge as its own; projection is the transfer of that content onto an available other; the scapegoat is the institutional form of the transfer; and the old ethic — the ethic of identification with the good — perpetuates evil precisely through the expulsion it performs in the good's name. Neumann was explicit that this is a general anthropology, and its generality is the source of its power. It also predicts its own misuse. A general anthropology of category-formation is itself a category machine.

This is not a scruple I invented for the occasion. It is visible in Jung's Wotan essay [9], the most compromised text in the tradition and, for that reason, the most instructive. Jung read National Socialism as the eruption of an archaic Germanic archetype, and the reading has a genuine explanatory pleasure to it: something numinous was loose in Germany, people did not merely believe the movement but were possessed by it, and strictly rational accounts of interest and incentive do not capture that. But an archetype cannot be arrested. Bureaucrats can. Railway timetables were drawn up by named men at named desks [10], and the reserve policemen of Battalion 101 made individual decisions in a Polish forest that were, now of decision, refusable [11]. Jung's postwar attempt to reckon with this [12] never quite got past the difficulty that a mythological aetiology of atrocity distributes responsibility exactly where responsibility cannot be prosecuted. The correspondence between Jung and Neumann through those years, now available in full [13], shows a younger man who understood the problem from the inside, because he was one of the people the eruption was coming for.

So, the discipline the first draft requires, and does not supply, is this: an archetypal grammar may describe the operation performed upon persons. It may never describe the persons. The sentence "the Tutsi became a category" is a sentence about the killers. The sentence "the Tutsi were a category" is a sentence I have no right to write, and the distance between them is the whole ethics of the enterprise. Levinas's objection to totality [14] is usually read

as an objection to philosophy's ambition; read against genocide it is something narrower and more useful — a rule about which noun a description is permitted to take as its subject.

My third paper supplies the evidentiary discipline that goes with the rule, and it is worth importing wholesale, because comparative work on catastrophe is exactly as prone to the error as comparative work on medicine. Samuel Sandmel's warning against parallelomania — the extravagance of supposing that literary similarity entails literary dependence — sets the bar for a claim of influence at the level of structure: does the borrowing culture take over not merely a practice but the explanatory architecture that made the practice make sense at home [15]? Two societies that both bleed patients in the spring have not thereby demonstrated contact. And the warning runs in the other direction too: the temptation is not only to find false parallels but false absences, to conclude from the absence of a familiar system that there was no system.

Both errors have exact analogues in what follows. Section XI asks whether the archetypal engine of 1936 is running today, and the answer will have to meet Sandmel's bar — not a resemblance of vocabulary or of affect, but the presence of the same explanatory architecture. And section VII concerns a false absence: the conclusion, in the first draft, that the assimilated Jew's recoil from the Ostjude had been voided by Auschwitz is an inference from an absence the argument manufactures for itself.

The first draft contains a caveat to roughly this effect. It says that a Jungian account which turns Auschwitz into another instance of universal mythology would itself commit an ethical violence by making the murdered disappear into theory. The caveat is not enough. A disclaimer does not undo a method; it only registers the author's awareness that the method has a cost he has decided to pay. What is needed is not a paragraph of self-warning but a countervailing procedure, something in the machinery that keeps returning the argument to a face. That is what the Jacob material is for. It was filed as an insert. It is in fact a brake, and it arrived, as brakes often do, after the descent had begun.

The Blind Father: Nomos, Apodeixis, and Who Verifies

Rebekah covers her son's hands and the smooth of his neck with goatskins, and Isaac, reaching for the son he cannot see, feels what he expects to feel. Genesis records the near-failure with a precision that should stop us: הַרֹךְ לֹבֶק יַעֲקֹב וְתַיְדֵיִם יְדֵי עֵשָׂו — the voice is the voice of Jacob, but the hands are the hands of Esau (Gen 27:22). Isaac hears Jacob. He touches Esau. He chooses the hands.

Everything in the double bind is already in that sentence. Jacob has not become Esau; he has become legible as Esau, to a judge who has decided in advance which register of evidence will be permitted to count. And the judge is blind, which is not a poignant detail but the mechanism: Isaac cannot verify by the sense that would require his son simply to be seen for who he is, so he verifies by touch, the one sense a disguise is built to defeat, and he trusts it absolutely.

Bildung was Jacob's voice. Baptism was Jacob's voice. The Iron Cross, the German better than one's Hebrew, the Goethe by heart, the son named Siegfried — all voice, all offered in good faith to a listener who had reserved final judgment for the hands. I have argued elsewhere that revelation in the Jewish sources characteristically arrives in

strange clothes, in a garment that misdirects [16]; the assimilationist's misfortune was that he wore a garment and the garment was what got read. Yehuda Leib Gordon's couplet stated the contract in its most economical form: הֱיֵה אָדָם בְּצֵאתְךָ: וִיהוּדִי בְּאָהֳלֶךָ: be a man when you go out and a Jew in your tent [17]. The public sphere takes the universal; particularity retires to the home. What the couplet omits is that the counterparty holds the sole right to determine which evidence is dispositive and may revise that determination at any time without notice.

Here my own paper contributes something the double-bind draft could not reach on its own, because the quarrel over which register of evidence counts is not first a modern quarrel. It is the oldest recorded dispute between the Greek and the Jewish intellectual worlds, and Galen states it himself.

In On the Usefulness of the Parts, he pauses over the growth of hair to contrast his own demiurge with that of Moses: Moses holds that it is enough for God to will a thing and matter is at once ordered accordingly, whereas Galen's craftsman chooses the best arrangement matter permits and does not violate it [18]. In On the Differences of Pulses the complaint becomes epistemological and sharper — that one cannot argue with the followers of Moses and Christ, among whom one hears undemonstrated laws laid down and accepted [19]. He is not objecting to Jewish anatomy; he shows no awareness that such a thing exists. He is objecting to a mode of authorization. In the school of Moses, a claim is warranted because it was commanded and received; in the school of Galen, because it was demonstrated from evident premises. Nomos against apodeixis — a difference in what counts as a reason, not a difference of temperament.

The rabbis would have accepted the characterization and taken it for a compliment. Theirs is not the absence of an epistemology but a rival one, in which the criterion of a valid norm is correct derivation and transmission within an authorized tradition rather than correspondence to demonstrable natural fact; I have argued elsewhere that this dual structure, a derivational track and a received track not reducible to each other, remains a durable feature of halakhic reasoning [20].

Now transpose it. The emancipated Jew's account of himself was nomos in exactly Galen's sense: I am what I confess, what I practise, what I have received, and what I have chosen to keep or to set down. The racial state answered with a counterfeit apodeixis. It claimed to demonstrate Jewishness from evident premises — four grandparents, a register, a certificate — and to derive the conclusion by method, overriding the subject's own testimony as the merely undemonstrated assertion of an interested party. That is Isaac's procedure given a filing system. It is also, and this needs saying because the resemblance is uncomfortable, a parody of demonstration rather than an instance of it: the premises were fabricated, the method was circular, and the demonstrative form was worn as a costume, exactly as the goatskins were. But the form did the work. What made the apparatus effective was not that anyone believed the science; it was that identity had been moved from the register in which a person can testify to the register in which a clerk can derive.

Jean Améry, who went into Auschwitz as an assimilated Austrian who had never learned Hebrew and came out as a man who called himself a catastrophe Jew, put the point with a bitterness no theology improves on he was a Jew because the others had determined it, and the determination did not admit of

appeal [21]. Hannah Arendt's older distinction between the parvenu and the pariah [22,23] describes the same corridor from the other end — two available postures, neither of which is a door out, since the parvenu is despised for arriving and the pariah for not having tried. There is no third position on offer. There is only the choice of which contradiction to inhabit.

Note also what the Jacob scene supplies that a description of the persecutor's malice does not. Isaac's blessing, once given, cannot be recalled. He trembles a great trembling when Esau arrives (Gen 27:33) and confirms the blessing anyway, error and all. Identity, once authored by the party with power to bless or condemn, becomes irrevocable regardless of what the disguised party intended, believed, or was. That is a fact about authorship rather than about intention, and it is why the genealogies were able to do what no amount of ordinary hatred could have done.

I want to be careful here, because this is the point at which the argument becomes seductive. It is easy to move from "the persecutor authored the victim's identity" to "the victim's identity was therefore nothing but the persecutor's authorship," and that is false, and it is false in a way that insults the dead. The Jews of Vienna in 1900 were right about their belonging in every sense in which a claim about belonging can be right — legally, culturally, contributively, by any standard a state is able to articulate — and it made not the slightest difference [2,24,25,26]. Both halves of that sentence must be held. The persecutor's power to assign is real; it does not retroactively convert a life into a delusion.

The Two Collapses

Something is missing from both drafts, and I found it in a diagram rather than in a paragraph: four positions around a centre, three of them labelled and the fourth left blank with a question mark. Setting it out that way makes visible a relation the prose had kept implicit. Assimilation and scapegoating are not two chapters of one story. They are the two poles of a single axis, and what makes them opposites is precisely what they have in common. Both are collapses of distinction. That is the whole of it.

The assimilationist erases the boundary between the Jew and the gentile. He does it himself, deliberately, at cost, over a generation or three, and he is proud of the work. Gordon's couplet is a programme for the controlled demolition of a boundary, and the demolition succeeded: within two generations of Vienna's emancipation the line between a Jewish physician and a Viennese physician was, in every register available to the men themselves, gone.

The scapegoater erases the boundary among Jews. He does it to them, by decree, and he is proud of that work too. The Hasid from Galicia and the baptized professor of Roman law enter one category, and the category is administered by a registrar who has never met either of them.

The same operation, run from opposite ends. René Girard's formulation is the sharpest I know: the sacrificial crisis is a crisis of distinctions, and the mechanism requires that difference be liquidated before a victim can be selected [27]. Neumann's developmental account runs on the same axis from the other direction, since for him consciousness simply is the achievement of differentiation out of an undifferentiated ground [5], and regression is dedifferentiation. On his terms both poles are regressive, however unlike each other they are in mo-

rality and in cost.

The asymmetry must be stated flatly, because a diagram flattens. One pole is a wish and the other is an act. The assimilationist's collapse costs him his grandfather's language; the scapegoater's collapse costs the other man his life. To put them on one axis is to describe a geometry, not to distribute blame. The geometry is worth drawing only because of what it shows next.

What it shows next is this. The assimilated Jew of Central Europe asked for a boundary to be abolished, and a boundary was abolished — the wrong one. He wanted the distinction between himself and the German to go. What went was the distinction between himself and the Hasid. The wish was granted in the wrong currency, by the wrong party, at the wrong end of the axis. I do not think this is irony. I think it is the structure of the thing: a culture that cannot tolerate a remainder will abolish distinctions in whatever direction its impatience runs, and nobody gets to specify which boundary is dissolved by asking politely for his own.

A second opposition crosses the first, and it is the perpetrators. At one end stands the unconscious projection that furnishes the whole apparatus with its energy — what Jung called Wotan, and what section XI will ask about in its present forms. At the other stands its only real countermeasure, a Shadow owned rather than outsourced. Two remarks about the figure follow from this. It is not a matrix, and the reader should not look for what its axes measure: it sets out two oppositions that cross, not two graduated variables that multiply. And the scapegoat pole, though it belongs to the first opposition, is not a Jewish stance at all. It is a deposit. Nobody arrives there by choosing anything; it is simply where the projection puts people.

Which leaves the fourth position, blank in the sketch and marked only Today? My first instinct was to read that as a question about history: where is the arrow pointing now, what is the current shape of the projection. Section XI takes the question in that sense and tries to answer it. But the more useful reading came second. The empty position is not primarily a question about the perpetrator's future. It is the location of the ethical task, and it is blank in my drawing for the same reason it is missing from both drafts: it is the only one of the four positions that nobody arrives at by default. Assimilation is what a permeable society offers and an ambitious minority accepts. Scapegoating is what a frightened majority manufactures. The projection is what an unowned Shadow does on its own. Only the fourth position must be occupied deliberately and held against pressure, and what belongs in it is neither disappearance nor category, but distinction sustained — particularity without inflation, universality without self-erasure. Sections V and XIII will show it occupied twice: once by an institution, and once by a man at a river.



Figure 1. Two oppositions, not a matrix. The solid diagonal is a single abolition of distinction approached from opposite ends — one chosen, one imposed. The broken diagonal runs from a Shadow outsourced to a Shadow owned. The fourth position is the only one of the four that nobody arrives at by default.

What Travels Alone

The mechanism is detachability, and I set it out first in the domain where I worked it out, because the transposition is then almost automatic.

Rabbinic culture in late antiquity lived beside the most sophisticated medical system the ancient world produced, and its borrowing from that system was heavy at one level and nil at another. It took Greek words for drugs, instruments and conditions; it consulted Greek-trained practitioners and admitted their testimony into halakhic deliberation; it certified remedies by cure-count with something very like a sample size. It took none of the conceptual apparatus: no doctrine of krasis, no four-humour typology, no tripartite soul seated in three organs, no teleological demiurge. Remove humoral theory from Galen and the edifice collapses; remove it from the Bavli and nothing changes [1]. The core professional term for a physician stayed Semitic, asya from the Akkadian asû, in a corpus that borrowed Greek words for hundreds of other things.

The pattern is not squeamishness, and it is not provincialism. It is a rule about what can be lifted clean. A recipe carries no cosmology, and an amulet that has cured three times makes no claim about who made the body. The humours, the tripartite soul and the craftsman-demiurge are not instruments; they are claims about what a body is and who made it, and they cannot be borrowed without being believed. A remedy travels alone. A system arrives with its theology attached.

The same rule explains a harder case. If Saul Lieberman is right that the rabbis of Palestine absorbed the philological technique of the Alexandrian grammarians — the critical signs, the conventions for reconciling contradictory lemmata, the apparatus for defending an authoritative text [28] — then the question is why they took the method and not the medicine. The answer is the same. A rule for handling a contradiction is a formal instrument applicable to any text whatever, including texts about which its inventors had no opinions. Form travels; ontology does not.

I have argued the same mechanism at work in a much later instance. The Brisker revolution transposed into Talmudic study the conceptual rigour, the analytic precision and the systematizing ambition that the German research university had made prestigious, while refusing point-blank the naturalistic epistemology that underwrote them there — a fourth option beyond rejection, assimilation and compromise, and one taken up most eagerly by exactly those minds most exposed to the alternatives [29]. The form was detachable and was taken. The ontology was not and was left. It is worth pausing on the fact that Reb Chaim's conceptual analysis of the tereifah categories has a formal elegance genuinely comparable to Galenic system-building while remaining wholly indifferent to whether any animal so classified would in fact survive. That indifference is not a defect in the analysis. It is the boundary being enforced.

Now the transposition, and it is the hinge of this essay.

The emancipated Jew of Central Europe made a detachability wager. He judged that the goods of European civilization — the language, the literature, the university, the professions, citizenship itself — were detachable from whatever cosmology had produced them and could be taken up without taking up any account of what a human being is or who made him. Gordon's couplet is that wager in a line: the public sphere yields a detachable universal, and whatever arrives bundled stays in the tent. It was, on its face, exactly the rabbis' own rule, applied by their descendants to a new and far richer

supplier.

Two things went wrong with it, and they are different things.

The first is that the goods were not as detachable as they looked. Nineteenthcentury European culture did not hand over Goethe and the Gymnasium and the medical faculty with no cosmology attached. Bundled into the offer, sometimes explicitly and sometimes as an unstated condition of sale, was an account of peoplehood — the nation as bearer of spirit, the Volk as a natural kind, and eventually descent as ontology. The buyer took what he understood to be a remedy and found that a piety had come with it. By the time the bundling became visible the transaction was three generations old, and the parties to it had grandchildren.

The second failure is worse and more general. Detachability is a judgment, and the question is who is competent to make it. The rabbis were sovereign over their own borrowing: nobody in Alexandria had standing to insist that if you take the eye-salve you must take the demiurge. The emancipated Jew was not sovereign over his. He could decide what he was taking. He could not decide what he was giving, or what would later be said to have been included in the price. The counterparty held the right to declare, retroactively, that the goods had never been detachable — that the language and the uniform and the professorship had not severed him from what he was, and that the register in which he had made his claim did not count.

Isaac's hands again. Whoever holds the power to bless holds the power to decide which evidence is dispositive, and detachability, like legibility, is authored by the party with that power. This is the third essay's thesis running backwards: where the rabbis got to say what travelled alone, the assimilated Jew discovered that the supplier does.

One further comparison, made carefully, because it can be turned into an accusation and I intend none.

The rabbinic system could borrow at scale without being consumed because it had a firewall. When Galenism did finally enter Jewish culture — through Arabic, centuries late, in Asaf and Israeli and Maimonides — it entered a legal culture that had already insulated its core from revision by medical evidence: the Geonic recognition that the sages were not physicians and spoke from the science of their day [30], the doctrine that natures have changed, and Maimonides' own ruling that the enumerated tereifot are fixed and may be neither added to nor subtracted from however the veterinary art develops [1]. That last is the crux, since its author was the greatest Jewish physician of the age and a thoroughgoing Galenist at the bedside. He did not reconcile the two because he did not think they were in competition. They answered different questions about the same flesh, and he held them in one skull under two criteria without embarrassment. I will want that precedent again in section VIII, where two grammars of divine concealment must be held the same way.

Emancipation offered no such jurisdictional clarity, and I do not think anyone could have supplied it. What was on offer was not a technique to be absorbed by a system that had already settled what it was. It was a whole social existence, and it demanded not a borrowing but a becoming. There is no firewall that lets a man take citizenship the way he takes a recipe.

Let me be explicit about what I am not saying, because the history of this exact observation is disgraceful. I am not saying that the assimilated Jews of Europe erred and were punished for the error. That proposition is a theodicy, and it belongs to the family of theodicies I have refused in print at length: every attempt to explain the Shoah by locating its cause in the victims' alleged deficiencies — Zionism, Bundism, Haskalah, assimilation, insufficient piety, inadequate Torah study — is to be refused without exception and without a hearing [31]. The wager was intellectually coherent, it was made in good faith, and it was honoured by the buyer. It was broken by the seller, who then murdered him. Nothing in the structure of the wager caused that, and an analysis of the structure is not an account of the cause. Section VII returns to this, because the same temptation reappears in a subtler form, and in a place where it is much harder to see.

The Brother I Did Not Want to See

Now the part I would prefer to leave out.

In the morning I stood in an abandoned corner of the Zentralfriedhof in front of the surviving granite stone of my great-grandparents, and later that week I put my hand flat on a panel in a park with sixty-four thousand names cut into it, one of them my grandfather's. In the afternoon of one of those days, I passed a Hasidic family on a Vienna street — the father in his kapote walking a few paces ahead, the children in a line — and something in me moved that I have no honourable name for. Not fear. Not disapproval. A flicker of embarrassment, arriving from somewhere I did not put it, in a city where the argument for solidarity had been made to me that morning in granite.

I have written about that afternoon at length elsewhere [3], and I do not intend to relitigate it here. What matters for the present argument is its structure, and its structure is not what the first draft says it is.

The historiography is well established, and I do not dispute it. Aschheim's account of the East European Jew in German and German-Jewish consciousness [32] traces the whole apparatus: the caftan and the beard and the Yiddish as an embarrassment of the not-yet-modern, the Ostjude as the figure through whom the Western Jew measured his own arrival, the reversal in some quarters after 1900 into a romance of authenticity that was no less a use of him. Rozenblit and Beller and Wistrich show how specifically Viennese the pressure was [24,25,26]: a community that had come from Moravia, Bohemia, Galicia and Hungary within living memory — my grandfather among them, out of Nádszeg in 1904 — and that filled the medical faculty and the law and the journals and the coffee houses, and that believed, not without evidence, that it was home. My father carried the Kultur of that city to London and administered it to his children as though it were a vaccine — I published my own small account of the resulting negotiation forty years ago, a boy on a London street conducting diplomacy with a piece of cloth on his head [33] — and the humour of that world looked down on the Jews of other countries, and especially on the Ostjuden who poured into Vienna after the first war [2].

Kurt Lewin gave this a name in 1941, and the name has done damage ever since [34]. "Jewish self-hatred," with its prehistory in Lessing [35] and its scholarly elaboration in Gilman [36], has the shape of an explanation and the function of an accusation. It sounds analytic and operates polemi-

cally; in current usage it is a term one applies to Jews whose politics one dislikes. I decline it. Not because the phenomenon it points at is imaginary — I felt the phenomenon on a pavement in the sixth district — but because a term that cannot be used without indicting the person it describes cannot be used to describe oneself honestly, and honesty about oneself is the only reason to raise the subject at all.

What I would put in its place is a distinction I have made before and want to insist on here [3]. The Hasid on the Vienna street is not my Shadow. He carries it.

The difference is the entire ethical content of the matter. If he is my Shadow, then what I feel is information about him, and the flicker is a perception. If he merely carries it, then what I feel is information about me and about three generations of a bargain struck in Central Europe, and he is a man with children and a Sunday afternoon who has been conscripted, without his knowledge or consent, into an argument I am having with my own inheritance. Neumann's new ethic [6], stripped of its vocabulary, says one thing: the obligation is not to abolish the flicker, which is not within my power, but to refuse to make anyone else responsible for it. That refusal is available. It is available in the same second in which the flicker occurs. It is, in fact, the only part of the transaction that is under my control.

There is a sugya that has been sitting in my Ḥullin notebook for a year without my noticing that it belonged here. At Ḥullin 107b two brothers may eat at one table, one with meat and one with cheese, and the halakhah turns on whether they are makpidin — whether there is enmity between them. If they are estranged, the arrangement is permitted, because the estrangement itself guarantees that neither will reach across and take from the other's plate. If they are on good terms, it is forbidden, because affection makes a barrier necessary that hostility has already supplied [37].

The law is lenient when the brothers hate each other and strict when they love each other, and I have spent a long time with that inversion. What I had not seen is what it says about the table I was standing at in Vienna. The estrangement between the assimilated Jew and the Ostjude did real work; it kept the plates apart; it made a certain kind of shared life possible without anyone having to negotiate what was in dispute. Kepeidah is a functioning halakhic mechanism, and it was a functioning social one. But the sugya is not endorsing the enmity. It is describing what enmity accomplishes, and permitting an arrangement on the strength of it, and every commentator who works on the passage feels the discomfort of a leniency that depends on a defect. A separation guaranteed by estrangement is a separation nobody has had to choose, and it holds only as long as the estrangement does.

The counter-case is one I have written from the inside. In an essay on a dream in which I exchanged wine across a border with a Palestinian interlocutor and then drank it in his village, I argued that holiness in the Jewish sources emerges not exclusively through separation from the Other but, more precariously, through dangerous relational encounter [38]. The two texts stand at opposite ends of the same question. Ḥullin 107b describes the boundary that enmity maintains for free. The dream describes the boundary that must be crossed and then reestablished by hand, at risk, with nothing guaranteeing the outcome. Only the second is an achieve-

ment.

One further observation, which the typology of the second draft obscures. What passed on that pavement was not a relation between a Jew and a majority culture. It was a relation between brothers, and it belongs to a different biblical family than the one I had been using — closer to Joseph and his brothers than to Jacob and Isaac [39]. The Hasid stands in that scene not as an accusing Judah but as Benjamin: the younger brother who never left, who never had to negotiate, whose presence unmakes the composure of the one who did.

Against the Persecutor's Resolution

Here is where the first draft cheats, and the cheat is instructive because it is a form of consolation disguised as severity — and because I accepted it for a long time before I saw it.

The Ostjude section resolves the recoil by invoking Auschwitz. The cultivated Viennese physician and the Hasid from Galicia enter the same racial category; the baptized Jew remains a Jew; the convert, the atheist, the veteran, the child with one Jewish grandparent — all of them remain, by decree. Therefore, the argument implies the assimilated Jew's distinction between himself and the Ostjude was always void.

Three objections, in ascending order of seriousness.

The first is the one my travelogue makes against most writing about Jewish Vienna [2]. It is the historiography of hindsight, which flatters the reader by allowing him to know better than the people on the map. Every account of that world must decide how to handle the confidence of 1900, and most handle it badly, in one of two directions: condescension, which assures us we would have read the signs, and nostalgia, which turns 1938 into a beautiful thing broken and supplies the aesthetic satisfaction that arrangement provides. The claim that the assimilationist's distinctions were illusory belongs to the first family. It is a way of being wise about people who were not permitted to be wise. And the travelogue's own formulation is the test: that is not a tragedy, since tragedy requires a flaw. Once you have written that sentence you have forfeited the right to any argument whose hidden premise is that there was one.

The second objection is that the resolution is donated by the murderer. Read the move slowly: the distinction between me and the man in the kapote is void because the racial state did not honour it. That is to let the registrar arbitrate an intra-Jewish moral question. And the same draft forbids this explicitly, sixteen sections later, in the strongest sentence it contains — that beyond Fackenheim's imperative not to grant Hitler a posthumous victory [40,41] there is a further and harder imperative not to allow him to determine the form Jewish survival takes, since otherwise the persecutor remains secretly sovereign, having determined that existence be organized forever around preventing his return. The prohibition is stated sixteen sections after it has been violated, which is the ordinary way a false consolation survives: it is contradicted elsewhere in the same document by an author who has not noticed. The persecutor does not only get to determine the form of survival; if we are careless, but he also gets to determine the form of Jewish selfunderstanding, including the terms on which one Jew is permitted to feel something about another.

The third objection is personal and therefore the

one I trust least and believe most, and it is the reason I let this passage stand for as long as I did. The resolution is too comfortable for me. It absolves the flicker by declaring it inoperative — a relic of a bargain that history has since voided. But it was not inoperative in 1908, when it governed which synagogue a family attended and which relatives were mentioned; and it was not inoperative on a Vienna street last year, at three in the afternoon, in a man of my age and education who had spent the morning weeping in a cemetery. A thing is not disproved by being refuted. That, in the end, is what Shadow means: it is not a proposition, and it does not withdraw when the argument against it is won.

There is also a formal name for the error, and section II has already supplied it. To infer from the persecutor's indifference to a distinction that the distinction was never operative is an argument from a false absence — the mirror of parallelomania, and the same failure of evidentiary discipline [15]. The Nuremberg apparatus is evidence about the Nuremberg apparatus. It is not evidence about what was alive in a Viennese drawing room in 1908, still less about what is alive in me.

The travelogue supplies the governing principle, and it was written about the Viennese rather than about myself, which is why I did not notice that it cut both ways. Standing on the Ringstrasse on the last morning, recoiling from a beauty I could not stop registering as beauty, I asked whether I had made Viennese-ness itself unclean, and whether that was not a mirror of their obscenity — the fantasy that guilt travels in blood down the generations. The answer was no: the category is theirs and I refuse to borrow it; guilt does not travel in blood; that was the premise of the people who murdered my grandfather and I will not adopt their metaphysics to grieve him [2].

The corollary is the sentence I had not written, nor will I adopt their taxonomy to absolve myself. The collapse of the distinction between the physician and the Hasid is a fact about the persecutor. It is not a verdict on the distinction, and it is not an amnesty for the man who once drew it. What Auschwitz proved is that the bargain was worthless as protection. It proved nothing whatever about whether the recoil was mine, and it is.

And note what that refusal is, in the vocabulary of section V. Guilt does not travel in blood is a detachability judgment, made in the one domain where a Jew still gets to make it. Grief arrived at my door bundled with a metaphysics of inherited taint, and I unbundled it. I took the loss and refused the cosmology. That is the rabbis' rule exercised on the murderer's goods, and it is the only place in this whole history where the party with the power to decide what travels alone is me.

Two Concealments

The theological quarrel can now be stated without ornament. The first draft treats divine hiddenness as an event within a relationship. Deuteronomy's doubled infinitive — וְאָנֹכִי הַסְתֵּר אַסְתִּיר פָּנַי, and I will surely hide my face (Deut 31:18) — presupposes a face that was previously shown and a covenant in which the hiding is legible as a breach. Auschwitz radicalizes the metaphor to the point of collapse, since a hiddenness that cannot be distinguished phenomenologically from absence is not obviously a hiddenness at all. The second treats concealment as constitutive. Ein Sof precedes every name. Maimonides makes the point a matter of logic rather than of piety: every attribute predicated of God affirmatively either reduces God to a creature or

turns out, on inspection, to be a negation wearing positive clothes [42]. Lurianic tzimtzum takes the same intuition cosmological — a self-contraction without which no nameable world could exist at all [43,44].

Choose the first and the apophatic tradition is decoration. Choose the second and the wound is a category error: if God was never available to positive description, then the silence over Birkenau is the same silence that has obtained since before the first day, and there is nothing new to mourn.

I refuse the choice, and section V has already supplied the licence. Maimonides was a full Galenist at the bedside and ruled the tereifot closed to medical revision in the code, and he did not experience the two as a contradiction because he did not think they were competing. Two criteria, one skull, different jurisdictions, no synthesis attempted and none required. That is the precedent, and it is a precedent from the tradition's most rigorous mind rather than an evasion improvised for the occasion.

Tzimtzum and hester panim are not two intensities of one thing. They belong to different grammars. Tzimtzum is ontological and pre-historical; it names the condition of there being a world with room in it, and its proper mood is not grief but astonishment [44,45]. Hester panim is covenantal and historical; it presupposes a face, a prior showing, a relationship with a chronology, and its proper mood is accusation.

The distinction has a technical payoff I want to state precisely, because it is not mine and it is the most useful thing in the Chabad material. In the Lubavitcher Rebbe's handling, divine contraction precedes and enables the very possibility of moral failure; withdrawal is prior to sin rather than a response to it, which means the covenantal drama of breach and punishment is played out inside a concealment that was already there [31,46]. That ordering does the work. It allows both drafts to be right — concealment constitutive, hiddenness historical — without permitting the first to absorb the second, because a condition of the world is not an answer to an event in it.

And the man who held that position most rigorously refused every theodicy for the Shoah. That refusal is the whole discipline. The characteristic error of a great deal of post-Holocaust writing is to relieve the historical wound by means of the ontological condition — to observe that concealment is metaphysically necessary and thereby to soften the fact that on a particular morning in a particular place child were gassed and nothing intervened. The rite of covering blood and its twentieth-century inversion, in which the ground was made to cover what no rite had prepared it for, I have followed elsewhere [47], and section XIV returns to it.

That softening is consolation smuggled in as metaphysics, and I have argued against it at length [31,48]. Berkovits's account of hiddenness as the price of human freedom [49] is the most serious version and still, I think, a version: it converts a wound into a mechanism. Rubenstein's conclusion [50] at least has the integrity of refusing the consolation by refusing the God, and Jonas's self-limiting divinity [51] pays for its coherence with a God who cannot be prayed to. My own preference has been for the dialectic of midas hadin and midas harachamim held open without resolution [52], for an anti-theodicy that treats the wound as an altar rather than as a problem awaiting a solution [31], and for the Piaseczner Rebbe's practice in the Warsaw

Ghetto of teaching without explaining — a man who went on giving Torah every week while conceding in a marginal note in 1942 that what was happening exceeded every precedent the tradition held [31,53]. It matters, too, that the mystical tradition itself carries a dark face of the Shekhinah which post-Holocaust theology has been slow to look at directly [54], and that where consolation fails altogether the heretical strand of Kabbalah has often been the honest remainder rather than the deviant one, locating the redemptive task inside the rupture instead of around it [55]. The discipline that governs all of this I first found not in a theological text but in a piece of criticism I wrote about a dying man's last record: the refusal of consolation as a positive achievement rather than a failure of nerve [56].

But apophasis has a second use, and it is not consolatory, and it is what the second draft was reaching for. Read as an explanation of the hiding, negative theology is a sedative. Read as a discipline of not-naming — as the sustained refusal to convert an absence into a manageable positive, with the divine essence functioning as a regulative limit on language rather than as an ontological substrate [31,57] — it is the opposite of a sedative. Post-Holocaust speech on this account must remain linguistically wounded, and that is a demand rather than a comfort.

It is also not sufficient, and I have argued the insufficiency myself. Apophasis destabilizes predication; it does not generate any demand that the finite selfremain finite. The warrants for that demand must be normative rather than metaphysical — the conditions of accountability, the structure of ethical summons, and the requirement of anti-theodicy after catastrophe — and none of the three can be extracted from negation alone [58]. The point transposes exactly, and it is the theological form of this essay's whole problem. Apophasis cannot tell the assimilationist why he should remain. Nothing in the discipline of not-naming entails that a distinction should be kept. The demand that the finite self-persist, and the demand that a people persist without inflation, are normative claims about what covenant requires, made in full awareness that the tradition contains the alternative. That is a much less comfortable footing than metaphysics, and it is the only one available.

A Remedy Travels Alone; a Piety Does Not

The best sentence in either draft is a single line of the second: idolatry is impatience with apophasis, weaponized.

Take it seriously and it repairs the weakest section of the other. That section argued that when transcendence becomes inaccessible the archetypal energies formerly housed in religion migrate — nation becomes sacred, blood becomes sacred, leader becomes sacred, and manufactured gods demand sacrifices. As an observation it is unobjectionable and as an explanation it is thin, because it does not say why the migration occurs. The apophatic account says why. The manufactured god is not a replacement for a God who left. It is a replacement for a God who was never nameable, produced by a collective that cannot sustain the discipline of not-knowing. What Volk and Blut und Boden and the Führer offer is not transcendence but legibility: a sacred that can be located, photographed, defended, and, crucially, distinguished from its enemies. Wolfson's term for the resulting condition — theomania, the compulsive positivization of what cannot be given [57] — names it better than the language of migration does. Drob's mapping of Jung's

kabbalistic debts [59] makes the affinity historical rather than merely suggestive, which is both its interest and its danger.

And here the detachability rule turns out to have been a theological rule all along, with an exact halakhic instantiation.

Rabbinic law will take a remedy from anyone. It will not take a piety from anyone. One may not accept healing that is bound up with idolatrous cult even at the cost of life (b. Avodah Zarah 27b), and the tradition that Hezekiah suppressed a Book of Remedies — however one reads it, and Rashi and Maimonides read it in opposite directions — testifies to an anxiety about therapeutic knowledge that arrives carrying its own theology [1]. The criterion is not the content of the good and not its efficacy. It is whether a cult comes with it.

That is the test I want to apply to political theologies, and it is sharper than anything in the genocide draft. The question to ask of a movement is not whether its grievances are real, whether its analysis is partly correct, or whether its ends are ones a decent person might share. Grievances are often real and analyses are often partly correct. The question is whether the thing arrives with a cult attached — whether taking it requires accepting an account of who is inside the sacred and who is outside it, whether it has martyrs and a liturgy and an eschatology, whether its enemy is an enemy or a contaminant. Wotan was not a remedy that Germany took. It was a piety, and it came with everything a piety comes with, and the tragedy of the assimilated buyer in section V is that he was trying to run exactly this test in a marketplace where the seller had stopped honouring it.

I must now guard this flank, because the figure I have constructed is dangerous, and it is dangerous in exactly the way section II warned about.

To say that the Jew occupies the structural position of the unnameable is to do to actual Jews what genocide does: to promote persons into a theological category. It is a compliment with a body count. Christian supersessionism has a long history of assigning Jews a role in a drama, and the role has never been survivable; the racial state assigned a different role in a different drama with the same result. My grandfather was not a signifier. He was a man from Nádszeg who came to a city, and the appropriate description of what was done to him is not that a symbolic function was violated but that he was murdered.

So, the rule of section II applies here with full force, and I state it now as the essay's central methodological commitment. The categorical analysis is permitted as a description of the operation the persecutor performs. It is never permitted as a description of what the persecuted are. The impatience is the antisemites, and to say that his impatience has a theological shape is to describe him, not us. That distinction is fine, both drafts blur it, and it will need to be defended in every paragraph in which the argument becomes elegant, since elegance is the specific temptation of this material.

The Legal Void

There is one further thing my own paper knows that both drafts needed, and it is the least theological-sounding and the most consequential.

At b. Bekhorot 45a the disciples of Rabbi Yishmael macerate in boiling water the body of a woman condemned to burning by the king, count two hun-

dred and fifty-two members against the canonical two hundred and forty-eight, and resolve the discrepancy by exegesis. I have written at length about what that episode shows regarding rabbinic anatomy [1]. What matters here is the enabling condition, and it is chilling in a way I did not register while writing about medicine.

Rabbinic law is fiercely protective of the corpse. The body is tzelem Elohim, and the image functions in rabbinic law not as metaphor but as an operative legal-theological fact generating rules about capital punishment, procreation and the treatment of the dead [60]. From this cluster derive kevod ha-met, the prohibition of nivvul ha-met, the rule that no benefit may be derived from a corpse, and the halakhic problem of wounding oneself, which presumes that the body is not simply the property of the one who lives in it [61]. Hillel's parable makes the logic explicit: the statues of a king are washed and honoured by those appointed over them, and the human being is the image of the King.

And the one rabbinic approach to human anatomical investigation happened at the single point that doctrine did not reach: a body already forfeit to the crown, belonging to a woman who stood outside the community who's dead the halakhah protects. The parallel with Ptolemaic Alexandria is exact — Herophilus's dissections were performed on condemned criminals supplied by the sovereign [62] — and the conclusion is a finding about the sociology of investigation rather than about Greeks and Jews. Where the law is silent about a body, bodies get examined.

Now generalize it, and the sentence becomes an account of atrocity. Where the law is silent about a person, persons get used.

This is what the first draft's account of genocide underdescribes. It gives an excellent psychology of the projection and almost nothing about the legal manufacture that the projection requires to become lethal. The decisive step in 1935 was not an increase in hatred; hatred was abundant already and had been for centuries without producing industrial killing. The decisive step was the production of a category of person about whom the law had been made silent — stripped of citizenship, removed from the professions, placed outside the community who's dead the state protects. Only then do Lifton's doctors walk in [63], and only then does Bauman's bureaucracy have something to process [64]. The legal void is not a consequence of the dehumanization. It is the instrument of it, and it is drafted by lawyers.

Two things follow, and they matter for section XI.

The first is that the warning sign is jurisdictional rather than rhetorical. Rhetoric is noisy and constant and mostly harmless; the lethal move is quiet and is made in statutes and regulations and administrative practice. When a class of persons is being moved out of the ordinary protections — when the question "does the usual law apply to these people?" starts receiving qualified answers — the machinery is being built, whatever the temperature of the surrounding language. Lemkin understood this, which is why Axis Rule in Occupied Europe is largely an analysis of decrees [65], and it is why the Convention that followed defines a crime rather than a sentiment [66].

The second is that the protection the rabbinic sources offer is not a prohibition but an ontology. Tzelem does not say that mistreating a body is forbidden; it says what a body is, such that mistreating

it is unthinkable. That is a stronger structure than a rule, because rules admit exceptions drafted by the same authority that wrote them, and the Nuremberg apparatus was scrupulously legal by its own lights. What cannot be legislated away is a claim about what a human being is. And that, in the end, is why this essay is theological and not only historical: the only barrier that has ever held against the legal void is an account of the person that the state did not issue and therefore cannot withdraw.

Wotan in 1936, and the Archetype Today

Jung published Wotan in 1936, returned to the wreckage in 1945 and 1946, and spent the remainder of his life being right about the wrong thing [9,12,67]. Before the sketch's question can be asked seriously, what survives of that reading must be separated from what does not.

What survives is the phenomenology. Political movements can become numinous; people are seized rather than persuaded; a party can acquire the affective architecture of a religion, complete with liturgy, martyrs, apocalypse and an enemy whose existence explains the suffering; and mass-mindedness dissolves the individual's capacity to hold a position his neighbours have abandoned [68]. None of this is available to an account built purely out of interest and incentive.

What does not survive is the aetiology, for the reasons given in section II and the further reason given in section X: the machinery is legal and bureaucratic, and a god cannot be indicted. Wotan describes the temperature. It does not describe the mechanism, and a description of temperature offered in place of a description of mechanism is an alibi.

With that division in hand the question marked Today? can be asked without embarrassment — and it must be asked under Sandmel's bar. The test for whether the engine of 1936 is running now is not a resemblance of vocabulary, and it is not a resemblance of affect. Every generation's politics is loud, and loudness proves nothing. The test is whether the same explanatory architecture is present: whether persons are being converted into a category, whether the category is doing work that a fact would otherwise have to do, and whether the law is being made silent about somebody. On that test, four things have changed and rather more has not.

The first change is deterritorialization. Wotan was a god of a soil and a people, and the possession Jung described had an address; you could name the country it was happening in. Contemporary archetypal possession travels through networks rather than borders. It recruits across states and across languages, and a young man in one country is now routinely seized by a mythology belonging to a landscape he has never seen. The archetype has come loose from the ground that used to carry it, which means the containment measures designed for 1936 — borders, treaties, the supervision of a defeated nation — address a distribution system that no longer exists.

The second is the dispersal of the leader-function. Jung's account required a figure into whom the archetype could be poured, and the Führer cult supplied the extreme case. Much contemporary possession is leaderless. The crowd supplies its own numinosity and the meme does the work the rally used to do: a compressed image, transmissible in a second, carrying an affective charge grossly disproportionate to its content — which is a serviceable working definition of a symbol operating under

possession.

The third is the mechanical selection of affect, and this is the genuinely new element. It is not psychological but industrial. Systems that rank material by engagement select, without intending anything whatever, for the highest archetypal charge: threat, contamination, purity, betrayal, and the enemy who explains the suffering. In 1936 a projection of this kind had to be organized by a ministry with a budget. It is now selected for by a mechanism that has no ministry, no doctrine and no intention, and which will therefore be defended by people entirely sincere in saying that they intend nothing. The Shadow has acquired, for the first time in history, an automatic amplifier that is nobody's responsibility by design.

The fourth is velocity. The conversion of a person into a category took the Reich years, laws, registrars and a Genealogical Office. It now takes a caption. What has not shortened at all is the conversion in the other direction: category back into person still takes a face, a name and an afternoon, and there is no technology for it and will not be.

Against those four differences stands everything that has not changed, and the list is longer.

The grammar has not changed. Crisis demands explanation; another is identified; complex causality is personalized; the other becomes contaminated; contamination becomes existential threat; removal becomes defence; defence becomes purification; purification becomes sacred duty; and murder becomes virtue. Lemkin gave the sequence a name [65] and the Convention gave it a law [66], and the roll of instances since has not stopped: Cambodia, Rwanda, Srebrenica, Darfur, the Yazidis at Sinjar, the Rohingya, and Darfur again in our own decade. Whatever else has been established, it is established that knowledge does not vaccinate.

The requirement of a usable rather than a coherent enemy has not changed.

Antisemitism could hold that the Jew was simultaneously the financier and the Bolshevik because the accusation was never empirical, and every subsequent instance of the grammar has displayed the same tolerance of contradiction: the minority is at once too weak to deserve respect and too powerful to be safe, too separate and too infiltrating. Where you find that pair of incompatible charges you are looking at a projection and not at an assessment.

The legal step has not changed either, or section X is the reason to watch for it. Every completed instance on the list above was preceded by an administrative act that removed a class of persons from the ordinary protections. That is the observable, prosecutable, documentable part of the sequence, and it is the part on which prevention has any purchase at all.

And the vocabularies rotate while the grammar holds. Racial language becomes ethnic language; biological contamination becomes demographic threat; hereditary inferiority becomes political treachery. I want to put the next point carefully, because it is where a reader will start looking for my politics. The grammar is indifferent to the moral polarity of the vocabulary that carries it. It can be spoken in the idiom of blood and soil, of national security, of civilizational defence, of anti-colonial liberation, of demographic anxiety, of religious purification. The test is never the vocabulary's moral prestige. The test is the one stated

above, and it is uncomfortable in every direction, which is the only evidence I have that it is not a partisan instrument.

Two further observations about the present, offered as a reader of the psychological material and not as an adjudicator of the disputes.

The first concerns accusation. Since 1948 genocide has been not only a legal category but a numinous one — the heaviest word available in the language — and words carrying that much charge become objects of contest rather than instruments of description. The consequence is that charge and countercharge can both come to operate by category-replacement, each side's principal claim being that the other is the Nazi. Someone convinced of the truth of one of those claims still must notice when the argument has stopped being conducted by evidence. I decline here to adjudicate the contemporary disputes; the facts are the province of investigators and courts, serious people disagree about them in good faith, and the instrument I am holding is not the right one for settling them. I have written elsewhere and at length on the theological question of justification that hangs over the present moment, and a reader who wants my substantive view should go there rather than infer one from a psychology of projection [69].

The second concerns inheritance, and it returns the argument to section VI. Volkan's chosen trauma describes how a group's wound is transmitted across generations as an identity marker rather than as a memory, so that descendants carry the affect of an event they did not experience and cannot correct by learning about it [70]. That is exactly the mechanism of what happened to me on a Vienna pavement: an inherited transmission, arriving three generations after the bargain that produced it, in a man who never made the bargain. A transmitted trauma is not thereby a fact about the present. It is a fact about the past that has acquired the phenomenology of the present, and every ethical difficulty peculiar to the third generation lives in that sentence [71,72].

Finally, the temptation Jung fell into is available again in new dress, and the tradition has a parable for it that is better than anything in the modern literature.

It is now possible to say that the algorithm did it — that the possession is an emergent property of a system, that no one intended it, and that responsibility is therefore distributed to the point of disappearance. That is Wotan with a server farm. At b. Sanhedrin 91a–b a lame man and a blind man rob an orchard: the lame man rides on the blind man's shoulders and directs him to the fruit, and when the owner comes each pleads his own incapacity — I cannot walk, I cannot see — and the owner sets the one upon the other and judges them together, because neither could have done it alone. The parable is told about body and soul at the resurrection. It reads equally well as a judgment on every system in which the archetype pleads that it has no hands and the bureaucracy pleads that it has no eyes.

The deeper objection to the temperament alibi is anthropological, and here Galen and the rabbis genuinely divide. For Galen, in That the Faculties of the Soul Follow the Mixtures of the Body, the soul's characteristics track the body's krasis: alter the mixture and you alter the character [73]. For the rabbis the soul is a deposit — as the Holy One fills the world so the soul fills the body — and character is not a function of mixture but a field of

contention between inclinations for which a person is answerable [1]. Galen's position was not intolerable to the rabbis because it was materialist. It was intolerable because it dissolves accountability into temperament.

Every modern version of the alibi does the same thing with different materials. Wotan dissolves accountability into an archetype; the engagement algorithm dissolves it into a ranking function; a sufficiently confident sociology dissolves it into structure. In each case a mixture is substituted for a deposit, and a person who could have refused becomes a temperament that could not. Responsibility remains where it was in 1936: with named persons at named desks [64,74], making decisions that were, now of decision, refusable [11].

So, the arrow marked Today? points roughly where it pointed. The engine is unchanged, the fuel has been industrialized, the conversion is faster, the vocabulary is more respectable and therefore much harder to see, and the countermeasure has not improved at all — since the countermeasure was never memory and was never law, but the far less scalable business of looking at a face, and of watching, in the meantime, what the statutes are quietly doing.

Choseness, and the Refusal to Borrow Their Metaphysics

The first draft contains a section on the dangers of chosenness — election becoming superiority, sacred history becoming narcissism, trauma becoming entitlement, victimhood becoming innocence, land becoming absolute. I stand by it, and I am aware that it is the section most likely to be quoted by people with no standing whatever to quote it. Two things must be said in the same breath, and most writing on the subject says one and omits the other.

The first is said from inside, and Neumann himself supplies the ground. No collective is exempt from the psychology it suffered. The formerly scapegoated can scapegoat; the traumatized can project; the persecuted can dehumanize. This is not a moral equation between perpetrator and victim, which would be obscene, but a refusal of a psychologically impossible category — a people without a Shadow. Neumann's Jacob and Esau, written in 1934 by a man who had just fled Berlin, is unambiguous that the old ethic perpetuates evil precisely through the expulsion of the scapegoat, and that the brother motif is where a collective's disowned material is most reliably stored [75]. A psychology developed in response to antisemitic projection becomes ethically vacant the moment it exempts Jews from the universal capacity to project. That would not be piety. It would be inflation of exactly the kind the section warns about.

The second thing must be said with equal firmness, and my earlier drafts left it out. A warning against inflation becomes, in the mouths of others, a demand that Jews perform exemplary innocence as the price of sympathy — and that demand is the double bind again, in moral dress. Assimilate and be accused of infiltration; remain visible and be accused of refusal; suffer and be pitied; survive with power and be indicted. The structure is identical, and the fact that the later version is phrased in the language of ethics rather than of race does not change the mechanism. I decline here, as in section XI, to adjudicate contemporary policy in an essay about Genesis and Neumann; the questions are real, they are contested by serious people on several sides, and I have treated the theological question of

justification in its own place rather than smuggling it in here [69]. What I will say is methodological and applies to every party: the moment an argument requires that one people be uniquely without shadow, or uniquely made of it, the argument has become the thing it is describing [76].

There is also a structural point available from section V that I have not seen made in this debate. What the rabbinic system possessed, and emancipation could not supply was jurisdictional clarity — the capacity to take a great deal from a neighbouring civilization while knowing precisely which of its claims one was not taking, and to say so out loud without either hostility or embarrassment. That competence is the practical content of the fourth position. It is not withdrawal, since the rabbis borrowed enormously; and it is not absorption, since they left the cosmology on the shelf. It is the ability to answer, about any offered good, the question what comes with this? — and to answer it oneself.

And the rule from Vienna governs the whole of it. Guilt does not travel in blood. That was the premise of the people who murdered my grandfather, and I will not adopt their metaphysics — not to grieve him, not to accuse anyone else, and not to absolve myself [2]. Fackenheim's 614th commandment forbids handing the murderer a posthumous victory [40,41]. The addendum I would attach is that borrowing his categories, in any direction and for any purpose, is such a victory, and it is the form the victory most often takes among people who would never be tempted by the cruder ones.

Peniel, and the Fourth Position

Genesis does not leave Jacob in the goatskins. Twenty years later, on the night before he must face the brother he impersonated to rob, he is left alone at the ford and wrestles until dawn with an ish who will not give his name. Wherefore is it that thou dost ask after my name? (Gen 32:30). What Jacob receives instead is a name for himself, Israel, and a permanent injury to the hip. He names the place: וַיִּקְרָא יַעֲקֹב שֵׁם הַמָּקוֹם Jהִים פָּנִים אֶל־פָּנִים וַתִּנָּצֵל נַפְשִׁי — and Jacob called the name of the place Peniel, for I have seen God face to face (Gen 32:31).

Peniel. Face-of-God, built from the same root that carries the whole weight of hester panim. The hiding of the face and the place where a face was, against all expectation, seen, are not two images a scholar has pressed together for convenience. One word generates both. My doctoral work on the imaging of the divine in rabbinic literature turned on a related instinct: that the tradition's boldest anthropomorphisms function as protest rather than as description, and that the face is where the protest concentrates [77].

Notice the reversal of method between the two encounters. Before Isaac, Jacob obtained a blessing by making himself falsely legible — engineering his body so that it would be correctly misread. At the Jabbok he holds on to an opponent who remains permanently illegible, refuses to release him, and is renamed by an encounter that resolves nothing except Jacob himself. Cataphatic disguise gives way to apophatic endurance, and it is the second encounter, not the first, that produces the name that lasts.

And the next morning — Genesis permits no chapter's distance between them — Jacob lifts his eyes, sees Esau coming with four hundred men, and says the sentence the whole night was evidently rehears-

al for: for therefore I have seen thy face, as though I had seen the face of God, and thou wast pleased with me (Gen 33:10). Panim el panim with the unnameable stranger turns out to have been preparation for panim el panim with the brother he wronged. Four things follow, and they are the reconciliation this essay was looking for.

First, the encounter that yields a name is with someone who refuses to be made legible. That is the exact inverse of the genocidal operation, in which the individual is replaced by the category. Levinas's face is not a metaphor for empathy; it is the name for whatever interrupts totalization [14,78], and Peniel is the scriptural instance. So, the brake the second draft applies to the first is not a mood or a scruple. It is a procedure with a text behind it.

Second, the fourth position now has a mechanism and not merely a location. I have argued elsewhere that what preserves a finite self before the Infinite is not a metaphysical claim but a covenantal asymptoticity, in which distance functions as the medium of relation rather than as its deficit — the structure R. Nachman gives in the parable of the Heart and the Spring, where the Heart longs for the Spring and cannot reach it, and where the world's continuance depends precisely on the gap not closing [58]. That is what distinction held consists of. Not a wall, which is the scapegoater's device, and not a fusion, which is the assimilationist's wish, but a sustained non-closure that does work. It is the same shape as Ḥullin 107b with the enmity taken out: separation maintained by intention rather than guaranteed by estrangement.

Third — and this is the part both drafts avoid — the reconciliation in Genesis is not a resolution. Jacob and Esau meet, they weep, they exchange gifts, and then Esau goes to Seir and Jacob goes to Succoth by another road, and Jacob is limping. The Hebrew Bible's one great scene of fraternal reconciliation consists of a single meeting of faces followed by separate roads and a permanent injury. That is a much smaller thing than the word "reconciliation" usually promises, and it is the only thing on offer. It is also, I now see, exactly what can honestly be claimed between the two drafts, and between myself and the man in the kapote: not a synthesis, not the abolition of the flicker, but a meeting and a limp.

Fourth, the question that ends the first draft must be restated. God asks Cain not "where is Abel" but אַיֵּה הֶבֶל אָחִיךָ, where is Abel your brother, and the ethical category precedes and survives Cain's answer; fraternity cannot be revoked by the act that denies it. In that draft the question is aimed outward, at the perpetrator, and it belongs there. What the Jacob material adds is the inward vector. Abel is the brother murdered by the other. Esau is the brother I wronged, whose face I must look at, and whose existence has been for most of my life an argument I would rather not have. In the family narratives I have worked on for years — Joseph and his brothers most of all — the somatic and communal rupture runs along that second line [39], and the reconciliations, when they come, are partial, late, and expensive.

Neumann took up the brother motif in 1934, in the year he left Berlin, and the coincidence is worth pausing on. A man walking out of Germany chose as his subject the collective symbolism of brothers, one of whom obtains a blessing by disguise and both of whom must eventually stand in front of each other. He did not treat it as an allegory of Jew

and gentile. He treated it as a study in how a psyche and a people store what they will not own. That is the correct reading, and it means the double bind is not only vertical — Jew before majority — but horizontal, Jew before Jew, and that the two are the same structure seen from two positions.

Not Hatred, Not Forgiveness

What the two drafts and my own paper share, once reconciled, is not a thesis but a discipline, and the discipline has the same shape in four places.

In the double bind, it is the refusal of the two doors offered: disappear into the universal or be marked as other. Both are the persecutor's doors. Mature identity, in Neumann's terms, sustains particularity without inflation and universality without self-erasure [6,7,8], and Soloveitchik's two Adams describe the same difficulty as a permanent dialectic rather than a stage to be passed through [79,80]. There is no third door marked resolution. There is only the willingness to stand in the corridor.

In theology, it is the refusal of the two doors of theodicy: justify the suffering or abolish the God who permitted it. The apophatic discipline holds the negative without converting it into either an explanation or an absence [42,45,57], and the normative warrants for remaining finite must be supplied from elsewhere [58]. This is not agnosticism, which is a position about evidence. It is a way of standing, which is a position about what one will not do with a wound.

In borrowing, it is the detachability judgment itself: neither the refusal to take anything, which is the fantasy of a sealed tradition that has never existed, nor the acceptance of whatever comes bundled, which is what emancipation turned out to require. What may be lifted clean is taken; what arrives with a cult attached is left; and the party who decides is oneself.

And in Vienna, it was the refusal of the two doors offered to the third generation: hatred or forgiveness. Forgiveness is not mine to give, since I am not the injured party — the injured party is a name on a wall — and the demand that the grandchildren supply it is an imposition. Hatred is unavailable, because it requires a defendant and everyone now in that city is innocent. What is left when both are refused is narrower and harder than either, and after eleven days there and a year of writing I still have no single word for it [2].

These are the same refusal. Apophasis is the negative move made in theology; the rejection of the assimilationist's two doors is the same move made in identity; detachability is the same move made in borrowing; and not-hatrednot-forgiveness is the same move made in history. In each case something is held open that every available convention wants closed, the holding costs something, and the cost is the hip.

Which leaves this essay where the first draft ended, but with the ground under it changed — and the ground is the right word.

Leviticus requires that the blood of a slaughtered wild animal or bird be covered with earth: a discrete gesture of honour, performed by a knowing human hand, returning the nefesh that has been taken to the adamah that receives it. Its theological obverse is the blood of Abel, uncovered, crying from the ground. I have argued that the crematoria constitute a precisely inverted kisui ha-dam — an industrial anti-covering designed to vaporize blood

into ash too dispersed to be received by the ground, to be buried, or to be heard as a cry [47]. That is the deepest thing the murderers attempted, and it has not been sufficiently registered: they went after the mechanism by which the question could be asked at all. Cain's blood cried out because there was ground to receive it. Ash on the wind does not cry.

So, the closing question is not rhetorical, and it is not safe. We will not satisfactorily answer where God was. Scripture puts a second question in front of us that permits no metaphysical evasion — אַיֵּ֥ה הֶ֖בֶל אָחִ֑יךָ — and the hidden God, in hiding, leaves the brother visible. But the twentieth century did its best to see that the ground would not carry the question, and if it is to be asked now it must be asked by somebody who has decided to ask it, in the absence of any voice from the earth compelling him to.

Which is why this essay ends with hands rather than with a face. My own antitheodicy concluded that after Auschwitz the heavens are disqualified as witnesses and the earth is tainted with ash, and that what remains as an altar is not the theologian's catechism but the hands of the one who attends [31].

The essay began with hands too — Esau's hands, worn as a disguise and read by a blind judge who preferred them to a voice. Between those two sets of hands is the whole distance this argument has travelled: from hands that are evidence, offered to be misread, to hands that are an altar, offered to do something.

And the brother I have most difficulty seeing is not the stranger and not the enemy. He is the one who looks like what I was taught, without anyone ever saying so, not to look like. He was walking with his children on a Sunday afternoon in the sixth district, a few streets from the address my father left in 1938, and he had no idea he was carrying anything of mine.



Addendum: The Hand Over the Mouth

Neumann's Excision and the Post-War Turn

The following addendum was written after the essay was complete, and it changes one of the essay's assumptions rather than merely extending it. It concerns a documentary fact I did not know when I wrote section VIII, and it makes the man whose psychology supplies the essay's ethical spine into a case study of the essay's own mechanism.

The lacuna

Transcribing Neumann's original typescript for publication, Ann Conrad Lammers discovered that someone — presumably the author — had removed a thirty-six-page section from two carbon copies of Part Two. Neumann was systematic about preserving every copy of his work, and a large gap in two otherwise intact, identical texts came as a shock. The removal could not have been accidental [8].

The missing section is Das Leben in dieser Welt — "Life in this world." It was not marginal. Chapter Two of Hasidism had originally been titled "The transformation of souls, and Life in this world," the table of contents still carries the section with all its subheadings, and the author's footnotes in other chapters still cross-refer to it. The book as Neumann left it continues to point at a passage that is no longer inside it. The removed pages have never been found. The section survives at all only because he had kept an inferior carbon, intact, together with an earlier version of Part Two [8].

What it contained can therefore be read. Under the subheading "Evil as a level of good," Neumann had assembled, from Horodezky's work on the Great Maggid, the sayings that repentance resides in sin as oil in the olive, that the holiest sparks exist on the lowest level, that goodness is hidden in darkness, and finally the word of the Baal Shem: evil is also good, it is only the lower level of perfect goodness. He then quoted Buber's meditation that the indwelling glory encompasses all worlds and all creatures, good and evil, and is the true unity — that in truth there is no opposition, for evil is the throne of goodness. And under "Accepting the world," the teaching that currently the greatest devotion, greater than learning and praying, consists in accepting the world exactly as it happens to be [8].

Lammers offers her reading with appropriate care, as belief and intuition rather than demonstration. Neumann finished Hasidism early in 1945 and wrote to Jung on 1 October 1945 that he still stood by it; the same letter contains the sentence that the Jewish problem and his work on it ended for him precisely at a time when it became conspicuous in the world in an indescribably ghastly way. She cannot read that without thinking of the visual evidence that became conspicuous with the liberation of the camps that spring, and she believes Neumann may have reread this one section with new eyes, since the missing pages are precisely his discussion of the Hasidic response to the problem of evil. There are times, she writes, when the paradoxical unity of good and evil cannot be spoken, or, if spoken, cannot be heard; in the immediate tremendum, to call evil the lowest level of good, and to say that it is the soul's duty to find the sacred meaning in every event, may appear meaningless, or insulting, or pathetically unaware. Her intuition is that he sent the pages to colleagues hoping they might help him reframe them and was perhaps advised to let them go. And then the sentence that governs this addendum: at some point, she believes, Neumann may have taken Job for his model and laid his hand over his mouth [8].

Neumann's own stated reason, given to Gustav Dreifuss in 1959, is different and must be kept in view: his scholarly conscience had stopped him. Raised in the German cultural context, he said, he did not truly understand his ancestors' form of life, and in writing Hasidism he had relied too heavily on Buber's interpretation, itself shaped by the general European heritage. He could not rewrite the book, because an understanding of the archetypal images in Judaism must grow from a full knowledge of the authentic writings and history of the Jewish people — some knowledge he did not possess [8].

Two reasons, then, fifteen years apart, and nothing in the archive requires us to choose. What follows treats them as describing one movement seen from two angles.

Two books at one desk

The chronology is not what the phrase "post-war Neumann" suggests, and getting it right is the first correction this addendum makes to my essay.

Depth Psychology and a New Ethic is not a work written after the catastrophe in response to it. Neumann began it in 1942, in Tel Aviv, with Rommel advancing toward Egypt and the small Jewish settlement in Palestine expecting the worst — with Rommel, as he put it, at the door — and completed it in 1943 [6,81]. Hasidism was finished early in 1945. The two books were written at the same desk in overlapping years by a man who had already heard what was happening in Europe.

So, he was not converted by the news. He was, throughout, holding two versions of a single insight: that good and evil are not the opposed substances the dualistic ethic takes them for. One version was theological, Jewish, Hasidic, mediated by Buber, and made a claim about the structure of being. The other was psychological, universal, mediated by Jung, and made a claim about the structure of the self. What 1945 changed was not which of them he believed. It was which of them he could publish.

The audit

Set the excised passage beside the surviving book and the operation is exact.

Cut: evil is also good, the lower level of perfect goodness. The Shekhinah encompasses good and evil and is the true unity; there is no opposition, for evil is the throne of goodness. The greatest devotion consists in accepting the world exactly as it happens to be.

Kept, and published in 1949 with a foreword by Jung: the old ethic pursued an illusory perfection by repressing the dark side and has lost its power; the deadliest peril is the scapegoat psychology that old ethic generates, in which we project our own dark shadow onto an individual or group identified as the enemy and fail to see it in ourselves; the only alternative is shadow recognition, acknowledgment, and integration; wholeness, not perfection, is the goal [6].

The difference between the two lists is not one of degree, and it is not psychological. It is a difference about what the claim is about. The Hasidic sayings are claims concerning the structure of the world and the glory that fills it: evil occupies a level within a unity that is divine. The New Ethic makes no such claim at all. It says that the evil a person disowns will be discharged onto somebody else, and that the only remedy is to own it. One is a theodicy. The other is an ethics, and an ethics that would remain true if the world had no glory in it whatever.

He kept the ethics and cut the theodicy. In the vocabulary of section IX, he took the remedy and refused the cult — and he applied that rule not to an alien tradition but to his own.

This obliges me to restate what this essay does with the new ethic. Sections VI and XII lean on Neumann's demand that the Shadow be owned rather than outsourced, and I have treated that demand as though it stood on its own. It does stand on its own; that is precisely the point of what was cut. But it is now legible as the detached remainder of a Hasidic theology of evil that its author judged unpublishable, and a reader is entitled to know that the ethic in question was arrived at with a theodicy attached and published with the theodicy removed.

The doctrine outlives the pages

The cut did not hold, and this is the part of the story that I find hardest to look at steadily.

In 1947 Neumann returned to Europe for the first time; in 1948 he gave his first Eranos lecture, Der mystische Mensch, and thereafter lectured at Ascona every year until his death, taking over the leading role after Jung's retirement in 1951 [82,83]. In the late essays gathered as The Place of Creation he introduced a concept that had no precedent in his earlier psychological vocabulary: Einheitswirklichkeit, unitary reality — a level of reality that exists beyond and before the primal split, out of which the polarized reality of our conscious minds developed, embracing both world and psyche, a realm in which the opposites are not [84,85].

Set that beside what he had cut. There is no opposition, for evil is the throne of goodness. Under a different name, in a different language, before a different audience, and with no God in the sentence.

I want to mark the status of this observation carefully, because section II's evidentiary bar applies to me as much as to anyone. Neumann's unitary reality has its own genealogy — Jung's unus mundus, the alchemical tradition, the physics of his moment — and I am not claiming a documented derivation from the excised pages. Sandmel's warning is that structural resemblance does not establish dependence [15]. What I am claiming is narrower and, I think, defensible: that the same content, having been judged unsayable in 1945 in its theological carrier, became sayable within three years in a psychological one, before an international and largely non-Jewish audience, in a vocabulary that made no claim about the God of Israel. The thirty-six pages were never recovered. The doctrine was never lost.

That is the detachability mechanism operating inside a single mind under catastrophe, and it is the reason this addendum belongs to this essay rather than to a study of Neumann. What travels alone travels; what arrives bundled stays in the drawer.

What the horror dismantled

It is tempting to say that the Shoah destroyed Neumann's archetypal theory. It did not, and the distinction matters.

What it destroyed was a particular romantic construction of Hasidism, and Neumann said so himself. His 1959 explanation — German formation, no true understanding of his ancestors' form of life, too much reliance on Buber, whose interpretation was itself shaped by the general European heritage — is a confession of exactly the predicament this essay has been tracking, made by the man who supplied its psychology. Two assimilated Central European Jews, one reconstructing Hasidism for moderns and the other building a depth psychology on that reconstruction, discovering after the murder of the world they were writing about that their access to it had been mediated all the way down. Moshe Idel's summary of Buber — that, guided by his phenomenological approach, he ultimately arrived at the view that Hasidism expressed the quintessence of Judaism — could be said equally, as Lammers notes, of the young Neumann [8]; Neumann regarded himself a disciple of Buber, and the debt has been traced in detail [81,85]. The Ostjude of section VI turns out to have been not only the object of the assimilated Jew's recoil but the object of his longing, and in both directions, he was a construction.

What the horror did not destroy was the archetypal apparatus. Neumann did not abandon it after 1945;

he made it his life's work, and it made him internationally famous. What changed was its referent. The Origins and History of Consciousness appeared in 1949 [5] — a universal history of the emergence of consciousness, drawing its mythologems from several traditions, written by a man who had just stopped being able to write the history of his own people's consciousness. Lammers's own titling note records what was set aside: Neumann's working titles for the abandoned work had included Ursprungsgeschichte des jüdischen Bewusstseins, the origins and history of Jewish consciousness [8].

The adjective was dropped and the noun published. That is the whole movement in a single act of naming.

The universal travels

I set down the last observation without relish, because it can be made to sound like an accusation and I do not intend one.

The Jewish books stayed in a drawer for the rest of Neumann's life. The universal books went to Eranos, to the Bollingen Foundation — which awarded him a fellowship in 1948 that supported twelve years of work [83] — to Princeton, to an international readership, and into a body of thought that is still read. A German-Jewish refugee in Tel Aviv became one of the most widely read psychologists of the century on the strength of the writing that had the taken out of it, while the writing that had the particular in it was preserved, unpublished, and withheld.

That is the assimilationist's bargain of section V, conducted at the level of a scholarly career and with the same terms: the detachable universal travels, the bundled stays in the tent. And it is not a hypocrisy. It is what a market in ideas does, and Neumann's own stated reason for withholding was scholarly humility rather than ambition. He remained in Tel Aviv, a lifelong Zionist who founded analytical psychology in Israel, refused a university clinic directorship, and declined even to own a telephone. He did not leave the tent. He simply found, as his grandparents' generation had found in another register, that what could be sold was the part with the theology removed.

What these returns to the essay

Five things, and one caution.

First, section VIII gains a third concealment. The essay distinguishes tzimtzum, ontological and prehistorical, from hester panim, covenantal and historical. Neumann supplies a third: an author's withdrawal from his own text, performed on the page, leaving the table of contents intact and the crossreferences still pointing. A hiding that presupposes a prior showing, with the index preserved so that the absence remains legible. If I wanted a codicological emblem for hester panim I would not find a better, one.

Second, the essay's anti-theodicy acquires an instance in the imperative mood. My own position has been that the Shoah admits no theological explanation and that the honest posture is teaching without explaining, as the Piaseczner practised it in Warsaw [31]. Neumann did something adjacent and stranger: he did not argue against theodicy, he removed one — the most beautiful one his tradition possessed — with scissors, from two carbons, and told nobody. The word for that is not argument. Lammers ‘sword is Job's hand over the mouth, and it is the right one.

Third, and against my own sympathies, the case tests the essay's admiration for the heretical strand of Kabbalah, which answers catastrophe by locating the redemptive task inside the rupture rather than around it [55]. The Hasidic material Neumann cut is not heretical in that sense; it is the classical unitive vision at its most confident, and it is the version that could not be spoken in 1945. The distinction is worth preserving: a theology conducted from within the abyss is not the same as a theology that tells you the abyss is a level of the good.

Fourth, section V gains its sharpest instance. Detachability is usually invisible, because the party doing the detaching does not narrate the operation. Here we have the seam: a document with a hole in it, an intact copy that shows what was in the hole, a letter dated within months of the removal, and a published book three years later containing the surviving half. There is no better-documented case known to me of a mind separating a doctrine from its cosmology under pressure.

Fifth, the essay's ethical spine is now dated. The new ethic was completed in 1943, before the full evidence, by a man who had a theological version of the same claim in another drawer, and who removed that version rather than the ethic. Whether the ethic can bear the weight the essay places on it, once one knows what it was separated from, is a question I have not settled and would rather leave open than answer too quickly.

The caution is the one that governs all of it. Lammers offers the Holocaust reading as her belief and her intuition; Neumann's own stated reason, given fifteen years later, was Buber and scholarly conscience; the pages have never been found; and the passage from unitary reality back to Das Leben in dieser Welt is an inference of mine, defended on structural grounds and by nothing else. Everything in this addendum should be cited at that strength and no higher. The one thing that is not an inference is the hole in the typescript, and it is enough.

Methodological note

Neumann left no systematic post-Holocaust theory of genocide, and the synthesis attempted here — hiddenness, archetypal vacancy, political inflation, projection, purification — is an extension of his psychology rather than a doctrine attributable to him. The two working drafts discussed and quoted throughout — After the Hidden Face and The Assimilationist's Double Bind — are not of my authorship; they are cited by section rather than by page, and passages attributed to them should be treated as quotations from unpublished documents. The transposition of detachability from the history of medicine to the history of emancipation is mine and not the historians': A Remedy Travels Alone argues the mechanism only for the rabbinic reception of Greek medicine, and its extension to the assimilationist's bargain in section V is an analogy defended on structural grounds, which section II's own evidentiary bar requires the reader to test rather than accept. The same caution applies more sharply to the theological joint proposed in section IX, which reads the demand for a legible Jew and the demand for a nameable God as one impatience: that is my construction, it is not in Neumann, and section IX states the limits within which I think it may be used. The autobiographical material in sections VI, VII and XIV is mine, and is drawn from an unpublished travelogue and a companion essay on the Vienna journey [2,3]; where those texts and the argument disagree, I have preferred the texts, on the principle that a record made closer to the event is likelier to be honest than an argument

made later about it. Verse numbering throughout follows the Masoretic text; readers using an English Bible should subtract one from the Genesis 32 references. Primary rabbinic sources are cited in the body by standard tractate and folio reference and are not separately enumerated.

References

1. Ungar-Sargon J. A Remedy Travels Alone: Greek Medicine, Rabbinic Law, and the Limits of Influence. Unpublished manuscript; 2026.
2. Ungar-Sargon J. The City My Father Lost: A Son's Journey to Vienna. Unpublished manuscript; 2026.
3. Ungar-Sargon J. The Street and the Home: Vienna, the Ostjude, and the Jewish Shadow — A Jungian Reflection on Returning to My Father's Vienna. Unpublished manuscript; 2026.
4. Ungar-Sargon J. Neither answered nor absorbed: the irreducible antinomy of personal address and impersonal ground in the theology of recovery. American Journal of Medical and Clinical Research & Reviews. 2026;5(7):1-17.
5. Neumann E. The Origins and History of Consciousness. Hull RFC, translator. Princeton: Princeton University Press; 1954.
6. Neumann E. Depth Psychology and a New Ethic. Rolfe E, translator. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons; 1969.
7. Neumann E. The Roots of Jewish Consciousness. Volume One: Revelation and Apocalypse. Lammers AC, editor; Kyburz M, Lammers AC, translators. London: Routledge; 2019.
8. Neumann E. The Roots of Jewish Consciousness. Volume Two: Hasidism. Lammers AC, editor; Kyburz M, Lammers AC, translators. London: Routledge; 2019.
9. Jung CG. Wotan. In: Civilization in Transition. Collected Works, vol 10. 2nd ed. Hull RFC, translator. Princeton: Princeton University Press; 1970. p. 179-93.
10. Hilberg R. The Destruction of the European Jews. Rev ed. New York: Holmes & Meier; 1985.
11. Browning CR. Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland. New York: HarperCollins; 1992.
12. Jung CG. After the catastrophe. In: Civilization in Transition. Collected Works, vol 10. 2nd ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press; 1970. p. 194-217.
13. Liebscher M, editor. Analytical Psychology in Exile: The Correspondence of C. G. Jung and Erich Neumann. Princeton: Princeton University Press; 2015.
14. Levinas E. Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority. Lingis A, translator. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press; 1969.
15. Sandmel S. Parallelomania. Journal of Biblical Literature. 1962;81(1):1-13.
16. Ungar-Sargon J. Revelation in strange clothes: heresy as deferred prophecy in Orthodox Jewish thought. Journal of Religion and Theology. 2025;7(2):25-35.
17. Gordon YL. Hakitzah ami [Awake, my people!]. Ha-Karmel. 1866. Reprinted in: Kol Shirei Yehudah Leib Gordon. Various editions.
18. Galen. On the Usefulness of the Parts of the Body. May MT, translator. Ithaca: Cornell University Press; 1968.
19. Walzer R. Galen on Jews and Christians. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 1949.
20. Ungar-Sargon J. The dual nature of halachic decision-making: rational and intuitive pathways. Journal of Jewish Legal Theory. 2025;8(1):1-19.
21. Améry J. At the Mind's Limits: Contemplations by a Survivor on Auschwitz and Its Realities.

Rosenfeld S, Rosenfeld SP, translators. Bloomington: Indiana University Press; 1980.
22. Arendt H. The Jew as pariah: a hidden tradition. Jewish Social Studies. 1944;6(2):99-122.
23. Arendt H. The Origins of Totalitarianism. New York: Harcourt Brace; 1951.
24. Rozenblit MI. The Jews of Vienna, 1867-1914: Assimilation and Identity. Albany: State University of New York Press; 1983.
25. Beller S. Vienna and the Jews, 1867-1938: A Cultural History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1989.
26. Wistrich RS. The Jews of Vienna in the Age of Franz Joseph. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 1989.
27. Girard R. The Scapegoat. Freccero Y, translator. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press; 1986.
28. Lieberman S. Hellenism in Jewish Palestine. New York: Jewish Theological Seminary of America; 1950.
29. Ungar-Sargon J. The Counter-University: The Brisker Revolution and the Psychology of Religious Rationality. Unpublished essay; 2026.
30. Brody R. The Geonim of Babylonia and the Shaping of Medieval Jewish Culture. New Haven: Yale University Press; 1998.
31. Ungar-Sargon J. The wound as altar: an antitheodicy of the Shoah. Journal of Religion and Theology. 2026;8(2):6-28.
32. Aschheim SE. Brothers and Strangers: The East European Jew in German and German Jewish Consciousness, 1800-1923. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press; 1982.
33. Ungar J. The agony of the yarmulke. Judaism. 1985 Aug. [Volume and pagination to be confirmed from the offprint.]
34. Lewin K. Self-hatred among Jews. Contemporary Jewish Record. 1941;4(3):219-32.
35. Lessing T. Der jüdische Selbsthass. Berlin: Jüdischer Verlag; 1930.
36. Gilman SL. Jewish Self-Hatred: Anti-Semitism and the Hidden Language of the Jews. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press; 1986.
37. Ungar-Sargon J. Enmity at the Table: Ḥullin 107b, Kepeidah, and the Paradox of Leniency through Estrangement. Unpublished essay; 2026.
38. Ungar-Sargon J. Dream, contamination, and the sanctification of ambiguity. Unpublished essay; 2026.
39. Ungar-Sargon JY. Fraternal rupture and somatic pathology: the Joseph narrative as clinical paradigm for family and communal conflict. Advance Medical & Clinical Research. 2025;6(2):238-42.
40. Fackenheim EL. God's Presence in History: Jewish Affirmations and Philosophical Reflections. New York: New York University Press; 1970.
41. Fackenheim EL. To Mend the World: Foundations of Post-Holocaust Jewish Thought. New York: Schocken Books; 1982.
42. Maimonides M. The Guide of the Perplexed. Pines S, translator. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; 1963.
43. Scholem G. Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism. New York: Schocken Books; 1946.
44. Ungar-Sargon J. Makom, tzimtzum, and the collapse of the horse-and-rider parable/mashal. American Journal of Medical and Clinical Research & Reviews. 2026;5(6):1-23.
45. Ungar-Sargon J. Language and meaning in sacred texts: transcendence, immanence, and divine concealment in Jewish thought. Journal of Religion and Theology. 2025;7(1):32-9.
46. Ungar-Sargon J. Radical rupture: Chabad's theological continuity when divine withdrawal

precedes sin. Journal of Religion and Theology. 2025;7(3):35-48.
47. Ungar-Sargon J. The covering of blood from Sinai to the crematoria on a silent thread and the twentiethcentury inversion of the covered ground. Journal of Religion and Theology. 2026;8(2):28-46.
48. Ungar-Sargon J. Revelation in concealment: toward an embodied post-Holocaust spirituality. Journal of Religion and Theology. 2025;7 (3):1-23.
49. Berkovits E. Faith After the Holocaust. New York: Ktav; 1973.
50. Rubenstein RL. After Auschwitz: Radical Theology and Contemporary Judaism. Indianapolis: BobbsMerrill; 1966.
51. Jonas H. The concept of God after Auschwitz: A Jewish voice. Journal of Religion. 1987;67 (1):1-13.
52. Ungar-Sargon J. Between divine judgment and divine absence: post-Holocaust theology in the dialectic of Midas HaDin and Midas HaRachamim. Journal of Religion and Theology. 2025;7(1):40-9.
53. Shapira KK. Sacred Fire: Torah from the Years of Fury 1939-1942. Miller JH, translator. Northvale (NJ): Jason Aronson; 2000.
54. Ungar-Sargon J. The duality of divine presence: exploring the dark Schechina in Jewish mystical thought and post-Holocaust theology. Journal of Behavioral Health. 2025;14(2):1-10.
55. Ungar-Sargon J. The holiness of the heretical: heretical Kabbalah as a response to catastrophe and the limits of theodicy. Journal of Clinical Oncology & Advanced Therapy. 2026;2(3):1-5.
56. Ungar-Sargon J. Blackstar: symbol, withdrawal, and the refusal of consolation. Journal of Psychology and Neuroscience. 2026;8(1):1-10.
57. Wolfson ER. Giving Beyond the Gift: Apophasis and Overcoming Theomania. New York: Fordham University Press; 2014.
58. Ungar-Sargon J. The heart cannot reach the spring: a normative case for an irreducible ayin and yesh. Journal of Psychology and Neuroscience. 2026;8(4):1-9.
59. Drob SL. Kabbalistic Visions: C. G. Jung and Jewish Mysticism. 2nd ed. London: Routledge; 2023.
60. Lorberbaum Y. In God's Image: Myth, Theology, and Law in Classical Judaism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2015.
61. Kraemer D. The Meanings of Death in Rabbinic Judaism. London and New York: Routledge; 2000.
62. von Staden H. Herophilus: The Art of Medicine in Early Alexandria. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1989.
63. Lifton RJ. The Nazi Doctors: Medical Killing and the Psychology of Genocide. New York: Basic Books; 1986.
64. Bauman Z. Modernity and the Holocaust. Ithaca: Cornell University Press; 1989.
65. Lemkin R. Axis Rule in Occupied Europe. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; 1944.
66. United Nations. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. United Nations Treaty Series. 1948; 78:277.
67. Jung CG. The fight with the shadow. In: Civilization in Transition. Collected Works, vol 10. 2nd ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press; 1970. p. 218-26.
68. Jung CG. The undiscovered self (present and future). In: Civilization in Transition. Collected Works, vol 10. 2nd ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press; 1970. p. 245-305.
69. Ungar-Sargon J. Ohr la-goyim: theology, statecraft, and the question of justification. Un-

published essay; 2026.
70. Volkan VD. Bloodlines: From Ethnic Pride to Ethnic Terrorism. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux; 1997.
71. Ungar-Sargon J. The wagons of indictment: Zohar, Rav Shagar, and the theology of betrayal — an addendum on the Nova Festival massacre. Journal of Religion and Theology. 2026;8 (1):9-20.
72. Ungar-Sargon J. The shared abyss: trauma, responsibility, and the space between mutual wounding and the ethics of reconciliation between perpetrator and victim. Advance Medical and Clinical Research. 2025;6(2):194-205.
73. Singer PN, editor. Galen: Psychological Writings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2013.
74. Arendt H. Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. New York: Viking Press; 1963.
75. Neumann E. Jacob & Esau: On the Collective Symbolism of the Brother Motif. Shalit E, editor; Kyburz M, translator. Asheville (NC): Chiron Publications; 2015.
76. Ungar-Sargon J. Moral injury, and the liminal theology of peace in Jewish thought, Jungian psychology, and the therapeutic imagination. Journal of Psychiatry Research & Reports. 2026;3(2):1-12.
77. Ungar-Sargon JY. Imaging/Imagining the Divine in Rabbinic Literature [dissertation]. Waltham (MA): Brandeis University; 2000.
78. Levinas E. Useless suffering. In: Entre Nous: On Thinking-of-the-Other. Smith MB, Harshav B, translators. New York: Columbia University Press; 1998. p. 91-101.
79. Ungar-Sargon J. The Lonely Man of Faith at sixty: dialectic, evolution, critiques, and an embodied resistance. Journal of Religion and Theology. 2025;7(4):95-105.
80. Soloveitchik JB. The lonely man of faith. Tradition. 1965;7(2):5-67.
81. Zakai A. Erich Neumann and the crisis of Western ethics. Society. 2020;57(3):332-42.
82. Neumann E. Der mystische Mensch. In: Der Mensch (2). Eranos-Jahrbuch 1948. Zurich: Rhein-Verlag; 1949.
83. Löwe A. Life and Work of Erich Neumann: On the Side of the Inner Voice. London: Routledge; 2020.
84. Neumann E. The Place of Creation. Essays of Erich Neumann, vol 3. Nagel H, Rolfe E, van Heurck J, Winston K, translators. Bollingen Series LXI/3. Princeton: Princeton University Press; 1989.
85. Kron T. Erich Neumann and Hasidism. In: Shalit E, Stein M, editors. Turbulent Times, Creative Minds: Erich Neumann and C. G. Jung in Relationship (1933-1960). Asheville (NC): Chiron Publications; 2016. p. 367-83.